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Abstract 
 
Although often overshadowed by the tumult in the region, and in Iraq specifically, there 
has been discussion in recent years of the normalization of relations between Kuwait and Iraq. 
The primary purposes of this study are, first, to provide an analysis of Kuwaiti foreign policy 
toward Iraq and, second, to determine the role of regional inter-state structures in shaping this 
policy. Using journalistic accounts, statements from government officials, and data concerning 
macroeconomic activity and military expenditure, this research shows that relations have indeed 
gotten closer between Kuwait and Iraq, particularly since 2010. Additionally, evidence is 
presented demonstrating that Kuwait is engaging in a foreign policy strategy of hedging in its 
relations with Iraq, allowing it to prepare for multiple potential security threats while 
maximizing short-term economic and political benefits. It is argued that closer ties between 
Kuwait and Iraq have been enabled and incentivized by the changing structure (both material 
and social) of international relations in the Gulf region. Finally, through its analysis of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy toward Iraq, this thesis seeks to demonstrate the potential usefulness of the 
concepts of strategic hedging and structural power in the analysis of small state behavior in 
international relations. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 Following the visit of a Kuwaiti delegation to Baghdad in early 2012, the office of Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued a statement conveying the Kuwaiti representatives’ 
emphasis on the necessity of Iraq joining the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).1 While, more 
than five years later, it remains true that there is no likelihood of Iraq joining the GCC in the near 
future, the statement was representative of the reconciliation which had been developing between 
Kuwait and Iraq since at least 2010. This reconciliation was particularly remarkable in that it had 
to overcome serious animosities between the two neighboring countries following Iraq’s 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91. 
A number of observers have noted the improvements in the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship in 
recent years.2 There does not yet seem to be, however, much in-depth analysis of this 
development. It is at times implied to be the inevitable outcome of the 2003 fall of Saddam; 
indeed, as this thesis will discuss, this event certainly played a role - but only in that it was an 
enabling factor, rather than a causal one. Given the substantial progress which was required to 
mend Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations, however, there are various aspects of this relationship which 
deserve greater inquiry - not least of which is the foreign policy strategy pursued by the Kuwaiti 
government and its response to the shifting dynamics of international relations in the Gulf. 
Accordingly, this thesis will focus on investigating the drivers of Kuwait’s policy toward 
Iraq in the post-Saddam era. In doing so, this work will analyze Kuwait’s policy toward Iraq 
through the conceptual framework of strategic hedging and discuss this policy within the context 
of the broader inter-state structure of the Gulf region, focusing specifically on recent changes 
                                               
1 “Kuwait stresses necessity for Iraq to join GCC,” Alsumaria News. Published April 27, 2012, accessed September 
25, 2016. http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/55919/kuwait-stresses-necessity-for-iraq-to-join-gcc/en#. 
2 Kenneth Katzman, “Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, (February 
19, 2016), 16; “Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander, US Centcom before the House Armed 
Services Committee on the Posture of US Central Command,” (March 3, 2015), accessed April 18, 2017: 23, 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20150303/103076/HHRG-114-AS00-Wstate-AustinUSAL-20150303.pdf; 
Anthony H. Cordesman, Robert M. Shelala II and Omar Mohamed, “The Gulf Military Balance Volume III: The 
Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S.-Iranian Competition Series 
(September 4, 2013): 37. 
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within this structure and the effects which they may have had on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship. 
 The concept of strategic hedging (or simply hedging) is one which has received 
increasing attention within the field of international relations.3 It is perhaps most simply 
understood as a strategy in which “engagement policies are pursued at the same time as indirect 
balancing policies.”4 While this definition will be elaborated on in the following chapter, suffice 
it to say for now that hedging has emerged as an alternative to realist theories which assume that 
small states are bound to either balance against or bandwagon with larger powers.5 
 In its focus on regional structure, this work hopes to bring greater understanding to the 
ways in which Kuwait has been incentivized, empowered or constrained in its foreign relations 
by the structure of international relations in the Gulf. Therefore, while international structures are 
crucially important to state behavior, they do not dictate states’ actions. Even small states such as 
Kuwait must be acknowledged as having agency in their decision-making, as well as the 
potential to benefit from - or be empowered by - structural configurations. 
 
 
Research Questions 
 
In light of these observations, this research intends to answer the following research 
questions: How can Kuwait’s foreign policy strategy toward Iraq in the post-Saddam era be best 
explained? Has the adoption of Kuwait’s strategy regarding Iraq been influenced by the structure 
of international relations in the Gulf region? If so, how? It is hypothesized that Kuwait is indeed 
engaging in a strategy of hedging toward Iraq and that regional structural factors have been 
greatly influential to Kuwait’s adoption of this strategy - in both enabling and incentivizing 
Kuwait’s simultaneous engagement with and indirect balancing against Iraq. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 Morten Valbjørn, “International Relations Theory and the New Middle East: Three Levels of a Debate,” POMEPS 
Studies: International Relations Theory and a Changing Middle East 16 (September 17, 2015): 74-5. 
4 Evelyn Goh, “Understanding “Hedging” in Asia-Pacific Security,” Pacific Forum CSIS, PacNet Number 43 
(August 31, 2006): 1. 
5 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 51-2. 
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Methodology 
 
The research presented in this thesis will employ a strategy of analytic induction, 
meaning that data will be gathered in order to test the above stated hypotheses. Revisions or 
additions to these hypotheses will be made as needed after an investigation of the data.6 A theory 
will then be presented as a result of this process attempting to explain Kuwait’s policy toward 
Iraq as well as the effects of regional structure on the adoption of this policy. 
The process for testing these hypotheses will be as follows: First, a descriptive account 
will be given of Kuwait and Iraq’s mutual reconciliation over the past decade and a half. Second, 
an analysis will be made of the ways in which inter-state structures in the Gulf region may have 
influenced this reconciliation. Finally - keeping in mind the possible effects of regional structures 
- the analytical framework of strategic hedging will be applied in an examination of Kuwait’s 
policy toward Iraq. 
This research will be conducted primarily through a qualitative content analysis of news 
articles and statements from governments or government officials, but will also make reference 
to macroeconomic data and reports of military expenditure as well as previous academic 
scholarship.7 Finally, throughout its analysis, this thesis will rely on a strategy of theoretical 
sampling in which various theories of international relations will be invoked and tested 
throughout the collection and presentation of data.8 The process of data collection will therefore 
be in part driven by the observations within these theories which are deemed relevant to this 
particular case study. 
 
____________________ 
 
 The following chapter will consist of a literature review providing an introduction to the 
theoretical concepts which will be referred to throughout this research. These concepts include: 
strategic hedging, small states, power, and structure. Chapter two will discuss, in detail, the 
developments in bilateral relations between Kuwait and Iraq since 2003 and provide some of the 
historical context for these developments. Chapter three will consist of an investigation into the 
                                               
6 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 539-41. 
7 Bryman, Social Research Methods, 276. 
8 Bryman, Social Research Methods, 414-6. 
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potential effects of regional structures on Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations, with particular attention paid to 
changes in both the power politics and the social structure of the Gulf region in recent years. 
Chapter four will provide an analysis of Kuwaiti foreign policy toward Iraq within the 
framework of strategic hedging, followed by a discussion on the theoretical concepts of hedging, 
structural power, and small states as they relate to this case study. Finally, the findings of this 
research will be presented along with a brief discussion of what the future could hold for 
Kuwait’s position in the region in light of its policy toward Iraq. 
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical Concepts & Literature Review 
 
 
One of the primary objectives of this research is to fill a perceived gap in the academic 
literature on the foreign relations of both Kuwait and Iraq. Within the field of international 
relations, Iraq is regularly discussed solely as the object of other states’ power struggles, while 
Kuwait is often neglected in favor of more typically dynamic GCC member-states such as Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).9 Further, while it may seem intuitive to some, the 
improvement in relations between these two neighbors deserves much deeper analytical 
inquiry.10 Specifically, it is crucial that analyses of this relationship take into account the effects 
of the broader regional structures within which Kuwait and Iraq are interacting with one another 
and the changes which these structures have undergone in recent years. 
As Morten Valbjørn points out, there has been somewhat of a boom in interdisciplinary 
dialogue between area studies of the Middle East and comparative politics in the years since the 
Arab Spring.11 The field of international relations of the Middle East, however, has been far less 
dynamic. Although there has indeed been important work published in recent years on the 
international relations of the region, Valbjørn argues that this work has not yet garnered the 
attention it deserves from generalists - nor has it come close to exhausting the opportunities for 
challenging existing theoretical concepts or exploring new ones. For the purpose of this research, 
it is important to establish a conceptual framework which can aid in better understanding the 
position of Kuwait vis-à-vis both Iraq and the broader region. Thus, this chapter will discuss the 
literature surrounding four applicable analytic concepts (strategic hedging, small states, power, 
and structure), aiming to further formulate such a framework. 
 
                                               
9 Jane Kinninmont, Omar Sirri and Gareth Stansfield, “Iraq’s Foreign Policy, Ten Years On,” in Iraq: Ten Years On, 
eds. Claire Spencer, Jane Kinninmont and Omar Sirri (London: Chatham House, May, 2013), 37, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/191107.  
10 Katzman, “Kuwait,” 16; “Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III,” 23; Cordesman et al., 37. 
11 Valbjørn, “International Relations Theory and the New Middle East,” 74-5. 
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Strategic Hedging 
  
 The concept of strategic hedging is a relatively recent development in international 
relations theory. While Evelyn Goh’s description of hedging as referenced in the previous 
chapter - a strategy in which “engagement policies are pursued at the same time as indirect 
balancing policies”12 - provides a basic introduction to the concept, Kuik Cheng-Chwee (in his 
analysis of Southeast Asian-Chinese relations) has developed a much more comprehensive 
conceptualization. Kuik defines hedging as “a behaviour in which a country seeks to offset risks 
by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, 
under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-stakes.” Kuik identifies five “constituent 
components” of hedging strategies. These five components include both risk-contingency 
options (indirect-balancing and dominance-denial) and return-maximizing options (economic-
pragmatism, binding-engagement and limited-bandwagoning).13 States engaging in hedging 
strategies employ varying combinations of these options as their respective circumstances allow 
or require. 
 The concept of hedging has been applied in two types of case studies within the academic 
literature: first, in cases of superpower interaction with one another (specifically, between China 
and the US); and second, in cases of smaller states which are facing multiple potential security 
threats. Regardless of case type, however, these studies generally have two unifying factors: the 
state engaging in hedging is often responding to changes (or anticipated changes) in systemic 
structure; and there are no immediate threats to the state in question.14 
 To this first factor, shifts in the hierarchical structures of international and regional 
systems - often precipitated by the rise or decline of larger powers - directly affect the security 
considerations and prospects for states within these systems. Shifting threat perceptions and 
uncertainties about the future often make it difficult to wholeheartedly pursue one 
straightforward policy (i.e. bandwagoning or balancing). This is not to say that hedging is a 
strategy employed only by those states which are unsure about to how to formulate their foreign 
                                               
12 Goh, “Understanding “Hedging,”” 1. 
13 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008): 165-6. 
14 Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging,” 165. 
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policies (as Goh implies).15 Rather, it is a way of rationally responding to a number of potential, 
but not imminent, threats and planning for multiple possible contingencies.16 
 To the second of these unifying factors, the more immediate the threats are that a state 
faces, the more it will be forced into purely balancing against or bandwagoning with other states 
in order to provide for its security. Therefore, while hedging states may be in the uncomfortable 
position of dealing with multiple potential threats, none of these threats is so immediate that it 
supersedes all others. 
 Applications of the concept of hedging to the Middle East are, so far, fairly few in 
number. Salman et al. use the term to describe China’s strategy of attempting to develop its 
economic and military capabilities in the Middle East “while avoiding direct confrontation with” 
the United States.17 Yoel Guzansky provides an overview of the ways in which the smaller GCC 
states (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman) are employing hedging as a 
strategy for dealing with Iran. Guzansky’s rather brief article, however, declares the concept of 
hedging in need of refinement and adjustment “to the accepted terms of the field.”18 Although 
Guzansky’s analysis is somewhat cursory (it fails to significantly contribute to the refining of the 
concept), it still demonstrates the relevance of hedging to the international relations of small 
states in the Gulf region. 
 Mehran Kamrava has used the term hedging to refer to Qatar’s activist, multidimensional 
approach to foreign affairs. In the case of Qatar, hedging has meant firmly placing themselves 
under the security umbrella of the United States, while at the same time maintaining ties with 
both Iran and Islamists in the region. While he describes hedging as an “insurance policy of 
sorts” and a “luxury of the weak only,” Kamrava also notes that it can be useful in terms of 
maximizing a state’s bargaining leverage: “Although [small states] may be in need of military 
protection from others, they can use foreign policy strategies such as hedging to greatly 
strengthen their leverage vis-à-vis potential foes and friends alike.”19 
 Unlike Guzansky, Kamrava argues that Qatar is the only small Gulf state to have 
employed a strategy of hedging to a significant extent. Kuwait, he writes, has “opted for close 
                                               
15 Goh, “Understanding “Hedging,”” 1. 
16 Kamrava, Qatar, 51-2. 
17 Mohammad Salman, Moritz Pieper, and Gustaaf Geeraerts, “Hedging in the Middle East and China-U.S. 
Competition 1,” Asian Politics & Policy 7, no. 4 (2015): 577. 
18 Yoel Guzansky, “The Foreign-Policy Tools of Small Powers: Strategic Hedging in the Persian  Gulf,” Middle 
East Policy 22, no. 1 (2015): 121. 
19 Kamrava, Qatar, 48. 
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alliance with Saudi Arabia and the United States instead of hedging.”20 While it may be true that 
the other Gulf states, including Kuwait, have not engaged in hedging strategies to the extent 
which Qatar has, this thesis intends to show that there is growing evidence of Kuwaiti hedging 
toward Iraq. 
 
 
Small States 
 
In its various applications to analyses of small state behavior, the concept of hedging has 
emerged as an alternative to realist international relations theories which argue that, when faced 
with potential threats, small states are constrained to either balance against or bandwagon with 
these threats. As Neal Jesse and John Dreyer have pointed out, however, these realist theories 
often do not line up with reality; indeed, the historical record is full of small states which have 
not followed these assumptions (their primary examples being Ireland and Switzerland).21 Jesse 
and Dreyer conclude that “[t]he role of small states has been little understood while also being 
over-generalized.”22 As such, the concept of hedging holds the potential to make significant 
contributions to the study of small states in particular. 
One of the shortcomings of much of the previous theorizing on small states is that it 
assumes that small states are typically consumed with ensuring their own security; this is due to 
their lack of relative power and the fact that in an anarchical international system “war may at 
any time break out.”23 As indicated above, however, threats are not always imminent nor do they 
always require a decisive response. Furthermore, states (especially small states) often face a 
number of threats that are “versatile, multifaceted and uncertain.”24 Therefore, having to plan for 
multiple contingencies with limited resources, states generally act on the basis of probabilities, 
not possibilities. 
                                               
20 Kamrava, Qatar, 70-1. 
21 Neal G. Jesse and John R. Dreyer, Small States in the International System: At Peace and at War, (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2016), 3, 32. 
22 Jesse and Dreyer, Small States in the International System, 3. 
23 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979), 102. 
24 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
52. 
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There is, additionally, a growing body of literature which sees small states as being able 
to “go beyond simple resilience” to the point of projecting power on the international stage.25 
Kamrava notes three tools of power projection which small states have at their disposal: “forging 
alliances, mustering up issue-specific power [norm entrepreneurship],” and hedging.26 While 
norm entrepreneurship requires that a state develop certain skills or capabilities, both alliance-
forging and hedging require a state to proactively take advantage of the configuration of the 
international structure which it inhabits. Inherent to this line of theorizing is the idea that power 
in international relations is not only derived from material or coercive capability, but can also be 
provided to states by structural circumstances. This idea holds particular relevance for small 
states, which are less likely to be able to rely on hard power capabilities. In its analysis of 
Kuwaiti foreign policy toward Iraq, this thesis seeks to contribute to ongoing discussions within 
the field of international relations theory regarding small states, their foreign policy options, and 
their potential for power projection. 
 
 
Power 
 
In its treatment of the concept of power in international relations, this thesis will 
primarily refer to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s definition of power as “the production, 
in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
circumstances and fate.”27 Barnett and Duvall present a taxonomy for the conceptualization of 
power consisting of four types of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. 
The distinctions between these four types are dependent on two dimensions of power: first, “the 
kinds of social relations through which actors’ capacities are affected (and effected)”; and 
second, “the specificity of those social relations.”28 Concerning the first dimension, power can be 
expressed either through interactions between actors or through the constitution of actors’ 
capacities, identities and interests. As Barnett and Duvall describe, power through interaction 
and power through constitution can be respectively thought of as “power over” (one actor’s 
                                               
25 Kamrava, Qatar, 48. 
26 Kamrava, Qatar, 49-50. 
27 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 01 
(2005): 42. 
28 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 45. 
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control over another) and “power to” (“how social structures and processes generate differential 
social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals”).29 The second 
dimension of power - the specificity of the social relations through which power works - 
differentiates between power exercised in a direct, causal manner and power exercised in a 
diffuse, indirect manner. While Barnett and Duvall emphasize that “in most social contexts” all 
four of these types of power “are operating simultaneously, intersecting with and reflecting off of 
each other,” the type of power most relevant to this research is structural power - that is, power 
which is expressed through the constitution of states’ capacities, identities and interests, but is 
exercised in a direct, causal manner.30 As Barnett and Duvall write: 
 
Structural power concerns the structures - or, more precisely, the co-constitutive, internal 
relations of structural positions - that define what kinds of social beings actors are. It 
produces the very social capacities of structural, or subject, positions in direct relation to 
one another, and the associated interests, that underlie and dispose action.31 
 
As will be elaborated on throughout this thesis, this from of power - dependent on the 
configuration of international structures rather than on relative hard power capabilities - may be 
particularly useful in understanding the social capacities of small states and may help to refine 
the concept of strategic hedging in international relations - a strategy which is itself dependent on 
international structural configurations. Furthermore, the concept of structural power is reliant on 
the ontological assertion that structure both “constitutes actors and their capacities” and “also 
shapes their self-understanding and subjective interests.”32 This view of a ‘constitutive’ 
relationship between structure and agent, as will now be discussed, largely accords with holist, 
constructivist theories concerning the nature of structures in international relations. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
29 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 42-8. 
30 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 67. 
31 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 52-3. 
32 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 53. 
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Structure 
 
The historically dominant conceptualization of structure in international relations, as 
proposed by neorealism, is based primarily on “the distribution of capabilities across units” 
within a given system.33 What is meant by capabilities is the material capacities of states to 
affect outcomes. According to Kenneth Waltz, notions such as “the principle by which a system 
is ordered” and “the specification of functions of differentiated units” have little concern for 
international politics due to the international system being both anarchic (lacking order) and 
“composed of like units.”34 In describing states as ‘like units,’ Waltz means that there is no 
substantial differentiation between states’ functions in the international system as anarchy does 
not allow for role differentiation. Structural change in neorealist international relations theory, 
then, refers to “changes in the distribution of capabilities across nations.”35 
Epitomizing the constructivist critique of neorealism, Alexander Wendt argues that 
mainstream international relations theory places too much emphasis on materialism at the 
expense of idealism. Wendt writes that: 
 
the character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states 
have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social rather than material 
structures. This does not mean that material power and interests are unimportant, but 
rather that their meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the system.36 
 
In focusing on social structures, constructivism not only emphasizes ideas (beliefs and 
expectations) over material capabilities, but also re-conceptualizes the very nature of the 
relationship between agents and structures. Mainstream international relations theorizing (both 
neorealism and liberalism, according to Wendt) largely sees states through an individualist 
ontological perspective: as agents existing independently of other agents and their external 
structure (the international system). Structures therefore have causal effects on states’ identities 
and interests, but do not constitute them. Adopting a holist perspective, constructivism views 
                                               
33 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 101. 
34 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 100-1. 
35 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 102. 
36 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 20. 
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structure as having constitutive effects on agents in that states are continually reconstituted 
through processes of social interaction and their identities and interests are constructed (at least 
in part) through shared knowledge. As will be argued in this thesis, Iraq may be an extreme case 
of an agent constituted by structure, but this is ultimately true of all states - to varying degrees - 
in that “international politics is an on-going process of states taking identities in relation to 
Others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the result.”37 As 
such, constructivism allows for the strong influence of domestic structures on the constitution of 
states, but asserts that these internal factors are incomplete without considering the external 
structures in which agents are constituted. 
 Drawing on holist, constitutive conceptions of structure, Wendt argues that the culture - 
the “socially shared knowledge” - of a system is crucially important to explaining and predicting 
the behavior of states.38 Accepting Waltz’s depiction of the international system as being 
anarchical, Wendt asserts that “anarchy can have at least three distinct cultures, Hobbesian, 
Lockean, and Kantian, which are based on different role relationships, enemy, rival, and 
friend.”39 Accordingly, “[t]he structure and tendencies of anarchic systems will depend on which 
of our three roles - enemy, rival, and friend - dominate those systems.”40 These cultures are 
internalized by the actors within a system to varying degrees: the first, whereby states recognize, 
but do not adhere to cultural norms; the second, whereby states adhere to norms out of self-
interest; and the third, whereby states adhere to norms because they believe them to be 
legitimate. In this way, Wendt himself refers to the Gulf during the 1990-91 war as an example 
of a system in which a Lockean culture had been internalized to the first degree - in that the norm 
of sovereignty was not willingly adhered to and had to be enforced through coercion. 
With these observations in mind, this thesis will employ both the Wendtian and the 
Waltzian conceptualizations of structure - finding both the distribution of cultural norms as well 
as the distribution of material capabilities to be of relevance to this case study. This thesis will 
therefore refer to both material as well as social structure throughout - at times specifying which 
is being discussed at the given moment, while at others referring to structures, in the plural, in 
                                               
37 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 21. 
38 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 141. 
39 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 309. 
40 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 259. 
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recognition of the ways in which these structures are often interconnected and acting 
simultaneously to produce certain outcomes. 
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Chapter 2 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi Relations since 2003 
 
 
Although often overshadowed by the tumult in the region, and in Iraq specifically, there 
has been discussion over the past few years of the normalization of relations between Kuwait and 
Iraq - the shedding of a “heavy burden” as Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah put it in 2013.41 
The burden to which Emir Sheikh Jaber was referring, of course, was the burden of history: 
primarily the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait from August 1990 until February 1991. It 
is important to remember, however, that the invasion - justified by Saddam on the grounds that 
Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC oil production quotas and (allegedly) stealing Iraqi oil through a 
process known as slant-drilling - was in part the culmination of bilateral tensions which stretched 
back decades.42 Indeed, when Saddam claimed Kuwait as Iraqi territory, he was tapping into a 
long-running narrative in Iraqi politics which considered Kuwait to be a ‘lost province’ of Iraq - 
a claim first made in 1938, under King Ghazi, and then again in 1961, by President Abdul 
Kareem.43 
 
 
Historical Context of Kuwaiti-Iraqi Relations 
 
At the heart of the territorial dispute between Kuwait and Iraq was the organizational 
structure in place toward the end of the Ottoman Empire, during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries; although administered locally by the al-Sabah family (which is still in power 
today), Kuwait was also a part of the Ottoman wilayet (province) of Basra - which would later, 
                                               
41 Adam Shreck, “Kuwaiti Premier Visits Iraq, Tightening Bonds,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, published June 
12, 2013, accessed July 15, 2017, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-kuwaiti-premier-visits-iraq-
tightening-bonds-2013jun12-story,amp.html. 
42 Katzman, “Kuwait,” 11. 
43 Jasem Karam, “The Boundary Dispute between Kuwait and Iraq: an Endless Dilemma,” Digest of Middle East 
Studies, (Spring 2005): 1. 
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along with the wilayets of Baghdad and Mosul, form the basis of the Iraqi state.44 Having been 
absorbed into the British mandate system following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during 
World War I, clear demarcations separating Kuwait from Basra were not made until the 
formation of the Iraqi state in 1932. Despite winning their independence, however, there were 
those in Iraq who felt slighted by Britain’s refusal to include Kuwait as part of its territory - a 
circumstance which not only limited Iraq’s access to the Gulf and the region’s oil reserves, but 
also, in the minds of some Iraqis, denied them what was rightfully theirs. In 1938, Iraq delivered 
to the British government a memorandum asserting its sovereignty over Kuwait. The British, 
however, dismissed Iraq’s claim – ultimately maintaining their titular authority over Kuwait until 
1961. Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory would continue while Kuwait remained under British 
mandate, although these were generally restricted to the Bubiyan and Warbah islands (in the 
waters of the Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphrates River). 
With Kuwait’s independence, made official on June 19th, 1961, came reinvigorated 
assertions of sovereignty over Kuwait from the Ba‘thist government in Baghdad (which had 
come to power after the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in July of 1958). In response - 
only eleven days after achieving independence - Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Abdullah al-Salim al-
Sabah was forced to request British military assistance in order to deter any potential Iraqi 
encroachment.45 Tensions would remain high between Kuwait and Iraq (despite Kuwait’s 
acceptance into the Arab League in July of 1961 - upon the condition that Britain’s military 
presence in Kuwait be replaced by Arab League forces) until 1963, when the two reached an 
agreement demarcating their shared border. As part of this agreement, Kuwait also paid the 
equivalent of 80 million USD to Baghdad. 
The Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship was fairly stable through the 1970s and 1980s, as Iraq 
developed into a burgeoning military and political power in the region - and Kuwait began 
increasing its international profile through the use of its economic capital (often in the form of 
humanitarian or developmental aid).46 When Iraq became mired in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, 
                                               
44 Emily L. Meierding, “No Blood for Oil? The Dynamics Interstate Petroleum Disputes,” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 2010), 102-4. 
45 Mary Ann Tètreault, “Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State: Ruling Kuwait in the Twentieth 
Century," International Organization 45, no. 04 (1991): 582-6. 
46 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The Gulf Goes Global: The Evolving Role of Gulf Countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa and Beyond,” FRIDE, working paper no. 121 (December 2011): 3-4. 
 
 
Jackson 18 
 
Kuwait contributed significant financial assistance (along with a number of other Arab and 
Western states) to alleviate Baghdad’s strained fiscal situation.47 
Despite the toll that the eight year-long Iran-Iraq War took on Iraqi society, Iraq was 
nevertheless still in a place of prominence within the Gulf region as well as the broader Arab 
world as the war came to a conclusion in 1988.48 Although the war ended with neither side being 
the clear victor, Saddam proclaimed that Iraq had successfully defended the Arab world from 
Persian aggression. Furthermore, Iraq’s primary competitors for leadership within the Arab 
world - Egypt and Saudi Arabia - were both discredited: Egypt for its perceived capitulation 
during negotiations with Israel and the US in the late 1970s; Saudi Arabia for its growing patron-
client relationship with the US.49 Additionally, Iraq’s army had more than quintupled in size over 
the course of the war - from approximately 190,000 men in 1980 to around 1 million in 1988 - 
while a staggering “$5 billion per year was allocated to rearmament” in the two years following 
the war’s conclusion.50 
Iraq was, therefore, at the peak of its power in the region when Saddam began agitating 
against the Kuwaiti government in the run up to its invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. It 
is imperative that an analysis of Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations recognize this - as it was not merely 
Iraq’s relative power advantages over Kuwait (or Saddam’s ego) which emboldened Iraq in its 
invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990, but also Iraq’s position in the regional power 
hierarchy. 51 Furthermore, not only was the invasion motivated in large part by Baghdad’s bid for 
regional hegemony (despite Saddam’s accusations of economic warfare on the part of Kuwait), 
but the operation itself would have been practically unthinkable had Iraq not been one of the 
preeminent military and ideational powers in the both the Gulf and the Arab world at the time. 
As it happened, however, Iraqi troops crossed the border into Kuwait on August 2nd, 
1990, taking over much of the country within a few short hours.52 In response, the UN issued 
Resolution 678 - authorizing the use of force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait 
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before January 15th, 1991.53 Following Saddam’s refusal to pull back, a US-led coalition 
(including a number of Arab states) began bombing targets in Iraq on January 17th. After five 
weeks of this bombing campaign, on February 24th, the coalition began its ground operations. By 
February 27th, the Iraqi forces had been overrun and a cease-fire declared. 
Iraq would become largely isolated in the region and on the global stage as a result of its 
invasion of Kuwait. The US and its allies imposed a strict sanctions regime on Iraq, restricting 
imports of food and medicine and greatly hindering Iraq’s reconstruction (the sanctions regime 
was so harsh that it prompted the then-UN humanitarian coordinator for Iraq to proclaim that it 
“amounted to genocide.”)54 As for Kuwait, it strengthened its ties with the US - becoming one of 
the primary bases for US military forces in the region. Kuwait would also play an instrumental 
role in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, hosting the majority of the coalition forces which 
would invade Iraq in March of that year - toppling the Saddam government and dismantling the 
Ba‘thist administrative state within a matter of weeks.55 
 
 
Kuwait & Iraq since 2003 
 
There was certainly some reason to believe, in the wake of Saddam’s ouster, that Kuwait 
and Iraq would soon be on their way to the reconciliation of their differences and a relationship 
based on cooperation rather than contention. Diplomatic relations were officially resumed in 
April of 2004 (on the same day that the Iraqi Provisional Government took over nominal control 
of the country from coalition forces) and, soon after, Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad al-Alawi paid a 
visit to Kuwait in commemoration of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.56 Despite these initial 
steps, however, subsequent progress in the relationship would come slowly, in part because of 
Kuwait’s wariness. As then-Speaker of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, Jassim al-Khoraffi, said 
in an interview in April of 2003: 
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[W]e will not rush to any regime as we did to Saddam’s regime before we make sure that 
the new regime is serious and keen about our mutual interests and good 
neighbourliness… It is our duty to get assurances… We have learned a lesson and I 
believe that we have to be logical and reasonable this time.57 
 
It was not until July of 2008, therefore, that Kuwait appointed an ambassador to Iraq (its first 
since 1990) - and not until 2010 that Iraq appointed its own ambassador to Kuwait.58  
An episode in the spring of 2010 would indicate the magnitude of the obstacles in the 
way of a Kuwaiti-Iraqi reconciliation. In April of that year, Iraqi Airways (Iraq’s state-owned 
airline company) resumed its commercial flight service to the UK for the first time since the 
company’s operations had been grounded in 1991 due to sanctions and reparations payments 
owed to Kuwait.59 Upon the arrival of the first Iraqi Airways’ flight at Gatwick Airport in 
London, however, the aircraft - along with the passport of Iraqi Airways’ chief executive Kifah 
Hassan, who was on board - were confiscated. As it turned out, Kuwaiti Airlines had filed a suit 
against Iraqi Airways in a UK court and had, in 2004, been given the right to seize the assets of 
Iraqi Airways within the UK. Six years later (and still owed more than one billion USD by Iraqi 
Airways), Kuwait demonstrated its determination to assert itself against its larger neighbor.60 It 
was subsequently announced, less than a month later, that the Iraqi government would be 
dissolving Iraqi Airways due to the burden of its financial obligations to Kuwait.61 
 Beyond demonstrating how much progress was still to be made in repairing relations 
between Kuwait and Iraq, the Iraqi Airways episode may have also served as a reminder to the 
Iraqi leadership that, in its re-entry onto the international stage, it must pay due attention to its 
regional relations as well as those with Western powers. Indeed, a little over a year later, the 
decision to dissolve Iraqi Airways would be reversed following bilateral negotiations in which 
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Kuwait agreed to accept a 500 million USD settlement payment from Iraq.62 Less than two years 
after this agreement, Iraqi Airways began offering the first direct flights between Kuwait and 
Iraq since 1990. This service was initiated in February of 2013 with a symbolic flight from 
Baghdad to Kuwait. On board were the Iraqi Foreign and Transport Ministers, who were greeted 
by Kuwaiti officials when they landed. The event was hailed at the time “as a sign of improving 
relations between the oil-producing neighbours.”63 
Since 2010, Kuwait and Iraq have made significant progress in repairing their bilateral 
relationship, with the period from 2010 to 2013 being particularly fruitful in this regard. In 
addition to the resolution of the Iraqi Airways dispute and the two countries’ cooperation on the 
matter of settling Iraq’s outstanding debts, Kuwait made a substantial show of faith in March of 
2012 when Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah personally attended the Arab 
League summit being held in Baghdad.64 Not only was this visit the first by a Kuwaiti head of 
state to Iraq since 1990, but Kuwait was also the only GCC member-state to send their head of 
state to the Baghdad summit (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain being embroiled in a 
dispute with Iraq over Baghdad’s criticism of the heavy-handed response to political unrest in 
Bahrain at the time). It was also in early 2012 that Kuwait voiced its support for Iraq joining the 
GCC - still the only member-state to have done so.65 
Most significantly, during this time period, Kuwait and Iraq worked together - both 
bilaterally and within the UN - to resolve their outstanding issues from the 1990 invasion.66 This 
culminated, in June of 2013, in the UNSC releasing Iraq from its obligations to Kuwait under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter regarding the return of Kuwaiti nationals, their property, or their 
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remains.67 Although this did not declare the matter settled, it was an acknowledgment of “[t]he 
common ground attained by Iraq and Kuwait regarding the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons and 
property...signalling a new level of mutual trust and a fresh chapter in the relations between the 
two neighbouring countries,” (as stated in a report by then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki 
Moon).68 Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, recognized this ‘new chapter’ during a July, 
2013 joint press conference with Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber Mubarak Al Sabah: 
“From last year, until now, the relationship has taken a big step thanks to the will of the two 
countries to solve all these issues.”69 
The 2013 report from the UN Secretary-General further recognized “[t]he recent 
fulfilment by Iraq of its outstanding Chapter VII obligations related to its common border with 
Kuwait.”70 While Iraq officially accepted the border demarcation in 1994, there have remained 
issues over the enforcement of the border and questions of whether or not Iraq would abide by its 
agreements - even in the post-Saddam era.71 Contributing to tensions have been questions of 
access to farmland, oil and gas reserves and fishing rights, as well as ongoing unrest amongst 
Iraqis living near the border.72 A bilateral agreement was reached in late 2010 whereby Kuwait 
would pay for the relocation of up to 50 Iraqi households in order for a no-man’s land of 500 
meters to be created on each side of the border.73 In the spring of 2013, Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nouri Al-Maliki sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General reaffirming Iraq’s commitment to the 
border, stating that he had “directed the competent Iraqi authorities to do all that is required with 
regard to the maintenance of the border pillars and the demarcation of the border.”74 
Despite the progress that has been made concerning the border, however, the issue is still 
occasionally pushed to the forefront of Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations. There was the recent incident, for 
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example, when six Iraqi fishermen were arrested by Kuwaiti authorities for trespassing into the 
Khor Abdullah waterway. Large parts of the Khor Abdullah are officially recognized as Kuwaiti 
territory, but still contested by some in Iraq. The arrested fishermen were soon released to the 
Iraqi navy, but the arrests sparked accusations of “Kuwaiti harassments of Iraqi fishermen” from 
politicians in Iraq and are an indication of the difficulties in enforcing the existing border 
agreements.75 Even more seriously, there have been renewed calls by Iraqi members of 
parliament to reject the current demarcation of the border altogether.76 These challenges to the 
border, however, have been strongly denounced by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and 
Kuwaiti officials have expressed their confidence that Kuwait’s sovereignty will continue to be 
respected by its neighbor (although Kuwait has also reportedly moved additional troops to the 
border).77 As Kuwaiti Deputy Foreign Minister Khaled al-Jarallah has stated: “We look at the 
positive side. The positive statements of the Iraqi official[s] including Prime Minister Haidar al-
Abadi and Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari are what matters.”78 
These border disputes aside, the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship continues to benefit from the 
progress made in the 2010-13 period. Kuwaiti officials recently, in October of 2016, stated their 
satisfaction with the Iraqi government’s attention to the ongoing matter of missing Kuwaiti 
persons and property.79 Additionally, Kuwait has been notably forgiving of Iraq’s inability to 
meet its financial obligations, agreeing to the postponement of Iraq’s final reparations payments 
from the 1990 invasion for the past three consecutive years (2014-2016).80 On the humanitarian 
front, Kuwaiti news sources have been keen to emphasize Kuwaiti aid to Iraqis affected by the 
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instability and violence in their own country.81 This has included providing economic assistance 
and training,82 supplying food and fuel for internally displaced Iraqis,83 and establishing schools 
and health centers in Iraq.84 Most recently, in April of 2017, it was announced that Kuwait had 
approved a grant of 100 million USD to the government of Iraq in order to assist with 
reconstruction in areas previously held by IS. The grant is the first financial assistance of its kind 
to be given directly to Baghdad by Kuwait since 1990.85 
 On a final note, there has also been substantial economic engagement between Kuwait 
and Iraq. This started soon after the removal of Saddam, but has increased as the domestic 
situation in Iraq has become (relatively) more stable and diplomatic ties have been repaired. The 
Kuwaiti telecommunications firm Zain, for example, obtained its first license to operate in Iraq 
in 2003. In 2007, Zain both acquired a major Iraqi competitor (Iraqna) and secured a 15-year 
license to provide services nationwide in Iraq.86 Today, Zain is Iraq’s largest mobile network 
operator and, furthermore, out of the 15 countries in which Zain operates, Iraq is its largest 
source of revenue by country.87 
In the energy sector, Kuwait Energy (founded in 2005) began expanding into Iraq in 2011 
when it was awarded two 20-year gas development and production service contracts for the Siba 
and Mansuriya fields, in southern and eastern Iraq, respectively.88 These were followed the 
subsequent year by an exploration, development and production service contract for the Block 9 
field (also in southern Iraq). According to its February, 2017 corporate profile, Kuwait Energy’s 
long-term growth strategy is substantially dependent on these projects in Iraq.89 Furthermore, it 
was announced in December of 2016 that Kuwait and Iraq would finally be acting on a 2010 
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agreement made “in principle” on the sale of Iraqi gas to Kuwait.90 Long delayed by Iraq’s 
problems with political violence and a lack of the necessary investment capital needed for 
infrastructure development, Iraq exported gas for the first time in 2016 and has pledged to supply 
Kuwait with 200 million cubic feet of gas per day. 
 
 
Beyond Domestic Politics: Toward a Regional Perspective 
 
 The end of the Saddam Hussein era was certainly a pivotal moment in the Kuwaiti-Iraqi 
relationship. Given the feeling of utter betrayal that many Kuwaitis were left with after Saddam’s 
decision to invade (Kuwait, after all, had been a reliable ally of Iraq throughout the Iran-Iraq 
War), any and all prospects for reconciliation were extremely limited as long as Saddam 
remained in power. Analyses of this relationship, however, should not end with this fact - as if 
amicable relations were the natural state of things and Saddam the only impediment to this. 
First, on the domestic level, political leaders in the post-Saddam era certainly deserve 
some credit for the reconciliation which has taken place. In Kuwait, Emir Sheikh Sabah not only 
has unquestioned authority on matters of foreign policy, but also brings significant experience to 
the table (serving as Foreign Minister from 1963 until 2003) and a tendency toward diplomatic 
engagement.91 As for Iraq, while former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (2006-14) provoked 
much criticism from the GCC states for his closeness with Iran, it must be pointed out that much 
of the reconciliation between Kuwait and Iraq took place during his tenure.92 Indeed, meeting 
Iraq’s Chapter VII obligations to Kuwait - and ridding itself of the accompanying UN sanctions - 
had been one of the al-Maliki government’s top priorities prior to this being accomplished in 
2013.93 
 While Kuwait and Iraq’s respective leaderships may each have played important roles in 
the tedious work which their reconciliation required, however, it is often difficult - if not 
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impossible - to fully analyze matters at the bilateral or even the domestic level without reference 
to regional and international structures. It is ultimately the inter-state structures in which states 
interact that set the limits on what they are able to achieve with their material capabilities and 
what is (and is not) permissible, norm-abiding behavior. Furthermore, the domestic political 
sphere is often imposed upon by regional and international politics - key examples of which are 
the 2003 externally-imposed change of regime in Iraq and the influence that various outside 
actors have had in Iraq since. In this vein, and as previously noted, Iraq is “an extreme case of an 
agent constituted by structure.”94 As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, this is true 
both in the material sense of structure - in that it was an asymmetric distribution of capabilities 
which allowed for externally imposed regime change to take place - as well as in the social sense 
of structure - in that external actors and cultures of shared knowledge have had considerable 
influence in setting the norms by which the post-Saddam government in Baghdad behaves and 
identifies itself as a state actor. Indeed, one could very well imagine a very different Iraq if 
Saddam had been able to simply pass the Presidency on to one of his sons (or alternatively, if an 
Iranian-inspired Islamic revolution had taken place). Questions such as where the regime derives 
its legitimacy from or how it views the sovereignty of other (Western-created) states would very 
likely have different answers than they do now. It is with these observations in mind that this 
thesis now turns to its analysis of regional structures in the Gulf. 
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Chapter 3 
The Gulf: Regional Structures in Flux 
 
 
The international relations of the Gulf region have perhaps been as dramatic as in any 
region of the world since the end of the Cold War - with the Gulf Wars in 1990-91 and 2003, the 
rise of non-state actors such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), massive fluctuations in oil 
prices, and periodic intensifications of the regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. In conjunction with its many developments, the structure of the region’s international 
relations has evolved - affecting states’ threat perceptions and their expectations of one another, 
as well as their own understandings of themselves and their own capabilities. This chapter will, 
first, discuss the material structure of the Gulf - focusing on the region’s power politics and 
touching upon, in turn, each of the (current and recent) powers in the region: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
the US, and Iran. Next, it will examine the social structure of the Gulf in terms of the norm of 
sovereignty and its relationship to Arab nationalism. Finally, this chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of the effects of regional structures, both material and social, on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi 
relationship - looking to both the constraints and opportunities which international structures 
present to states, as well as the ways in which these structures ultimately constitute states as 
social actors within an international community. This analysis will then serve as crucial context 
in chapter four’s examination of Kuwait’s foreign policy strategy toward Iraq. 
 
 
Iraq’s Fall from Grace 
 
 The two Gulf wars of 1990-91 and 2003 would both serve as pivotal events regarding 
Iraq’s role as a regional power in the Gulf. Perhaps first and foremost, the significant 
investments which Iraq had made in its military throughout the 1980s were made a mockery of in 
1991 when - in the span of a few weeks - more than 100,000 Iraqi troops were killed, another 
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60,000 surrendered, and much of Iraq’s military hardware (3,700 tanks, 2,400 armored vehicles 
and 2,600 artillery pieces) was destroyed.95 This effective neutralization of Iraq as a military 
power in the Gulf would benefit both Saudi Arabia and Iran - its two primary contenders in this 
regard. The events of 1990-91 also marked a key turning point in the US’s engagement in the 
region, providing it with the opportunity to impose itself as an active power in the Gulf - a move 
which would further elevate the position of its key regional ally, Saudi Arabia. The 1990-91 war, 
therefore, would set the stage for, as Kamrava writes: “the emergence of three poles of power” in 
the Gulf: Saudi Arabia (and the GCC); Iran; and the US.96 
Moreover, the utter devastation which Iraqi society experienced in the wake of the 2003 
US-led invasion (with the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, the rise of sectarian 
political violence, and the collapse of public institutions and the economy) has meant its 
temporary disqualification from the power politics of the region.97 The resulting power vacuum 
has led to a struggle for power both within the Gulf - between Iran and the GCC states 
(predominantly Saudi Arabia) - and in the broader Middle East - with Turkey demonstrating 
increasing regional ambitions. Baghdad, rather than playing an active role in these regional 
power contests, has instead been consumed by the daunting tasks of reconstruction and reducing 
domestic political violence - tasks made even more difficult by IS’s conquering of much of 
northern Iraq in 2014-15. In addition to its domestic woes, Iraq has - in its external relations - 
had to walk the fine line of balancing its reliance on its more powerful partners (most notably the 
US and Iran) with its desire to reduce their influence over its decision-making.98 
 
 
Saudi Arabia: The Rise of a Regional Power 
 
 Endowed with some of the largest known oil reserves in the world and having developed 
(at least since the 1973-74 oil embargo) a close relationship with the US, Saudi Arabia was well 
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poised to fill the power vacuum in the Gulf following Iraq’s decline as a power in the region 
from 1991 onwards.99 To contrast its economic performance against that of Iraq, Saudi Arabia’s 
GDP (according to World Bank estimates) is today approximately three and a half times the 
GDP of Iraq; in the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia’s GDP was only one and a half times the GDP of 
Iraq.100 Saudi Arabia has, furthermore, surpassed Iran during that time as the largest economy in 
the Gulf - despite the fact that Iran has a population nearly three times that of Saudi Arabia.101 
  The Saudi-US alliance was initiated in part a response to the 1973 oil embargo and the 
recognition of the US that it was in their interest to develop relations with (and gain leverage 
over) the states of the Gulf in the wake of Great Britain’s 1971 withdrawal from “east of 
Suez.”102 For the US, engagement in the region was initially guided by the ‘twin pillar’ policy, 
whereby the US sought to exert its influence in the region through close relations with Saudi 
Arabia and Iran.103 After the 1979 Iranian revolution and the collapse of US-Iranian relations, 
Iran was replaced by Iraq in the overall US regional strategy. US relations with the Saddam 
regime in Iraq, however, never developed to point of closeness which they had reached with Iran 
under the Shah - and would ultimately only last until Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. As a 
result, Saudi Arabia has reaped enormous benefits from the fact that it is the only major Gulf 
state which is a longstanding ally of the US. 
 Perhaps the primary benefit of Saudi Arabia’s ties to Washington has been its access to 
large quantities of state-of-the-art military equipment. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 - and 
Riyadh’s realization that Saudi Arabia would similarly be dependent on the US for its protection 
should one of its regional competitors decide to attack it - prompted the Saudi government to 
begin seriously investing in its own military capabilities.104 Saudi Arabia increased its purchases 
of military hardware (primarily from the US and France) and expanded its armed forces from 
approximately 67,000 active duty personnel in 1991 to more than 110,000 by the year 2000. The 
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boom in oil prices from 2002 to 2008 further enabled Riyadh’s military build-up, with Saudi 
military expenditure increasing by nearly fifty percent between the years 2003 and 2007.105 
Moreover, as figure 2 below shows, an even more dramatic increase would take place between 
the years 2011 and 2015, with Saudi military expenditure increasing nearly sixty percent during 
this time. From 2012 to 2016, Saudi Arabia was the second largest importer of arms worldwide, 
behind only India (Iraq was the world’s eighth largest importer over the same time period).106 
The result of this has been that, for the past two and a half decades, Saudi Arabia has been able 
to consistently make relative gains in its hard power capabilities vis-á-vis its regional rivals. 
 
Figure 2: Military Expenditure by Country (in constant 2014 US $ million)107 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Saudi Arabia 31543 38008 43297 49872 48949 50299 52350 53062 60041 68810 80762 85354 
Iraq 2090 2821 2025 3025 3778 3581 4200 6545 6305 8070 9516 12873 
Iran 10201 12131 14276 13142 12629 13220 13446 12150 12639 9984 9901 9969 
Kuwait 5595 5415 5353 5686 5235 5089 4996 5705 6178 5844 5942 -- 
 
 
 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have largely been aligned on security-related matters, 
particularly in their responses to the Arab Spring and their stances on organizations such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Kuwait has expressed its support for the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen 
and both countries participated the Peninsula Shield Force which provided support to the 
government of Bahrain in 2011.108 Further, the two have shown their support for the al-Sisi 
government in Egypt in the form of significant financial aid following the toppling of the 
Muslim Brotherhood-led government in 2013.109 Although there have been periodic disputes 
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between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in recent years over the rights to oil fields found in the neutral 
zone along the border between the two countries, these disputes have not, as of yet, posed a 
serious threat to Kuwaiti-Saudi cooperation on the most pressing security matters facing them.110 
Despite their frequent policy alignment, however, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have adopted 
markedly divergent approaches in their relations with Iraq. Relative to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
(who had opposed the 2003 US-led invasion - seeing Saddam as a buffer against Iran)111 has 
been much more wary of developing relations with Baghdad.112 Saudi-Iraqi relations were 
particularly tense under Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki, who had criticized the Saudi leadership 
for their ties to extremist organizations and whom Riyadh considered a “puppet” of Iran.113 
Bilateral engagement seems to have increased since 2014 - with both al-Maliki out of office and 
the accession of King Salman to the throne in 2015 - but significant problems in the relationship 
still persist. Notably, the progress represented by the 2016 re-opening of the Saudi embassy in 
Baghdad (closed since the 1990-91 Gulf War) was tarnished a few months later when Riyadh 
was asked to recall their ambassador over his criticisms of Shi‘a militias in Iraq.114 More 
recently, in February of 2017, the Saudi Foreign Minister paid a visit to Baghdad - the first such 
trip since 1990 (and one which it appears the US had a hand in arranging).115 
 
 
The United States: A Superpower Engaged 
 
 As noted above, meaningful US engagement in the Gulf began to take shape in the 1970s 
with the ‘twin pillar’ strategy. Under this strategy, the US relied on patron-client relationships 
with Saudi Arabia and Iran - the latter replaced by Iraq after 1979 - to secure its interests in the 
Gulf (namely the free flow of oil and an alliance structure opposed to the Soviet Union). The 
1991 intervention in Kuwait ushered in a new era of US involvement in the Gulf, marking its 
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first large-scale military operation in the region.116 This increased engagement was reflected in 
the shift from the ‘twin-pillar’ strategy to one of ‘dual containment’ - specifically the 
containment of Iraq and Iran, which were seen to pose a threat to the Western-friendly status quo 
in which both oil and petrodollars (the revenue accrued by oil exporting countries) were readily 
available to world markets.117 
This strategy of dual containment required the US to go above and beyond its regional 
patron-client relationships (which it still carefully maintained with its GCC allies) and impose a 
strong military presence on the region.118 This military presence has primarily taken the form of 
CENTCOM (US Central Command). Established in 1983 with the explicit mission of protecting 
oil flows in the Gulf, CENTCOM today has an area of responsibility which encompasses twenty-
five countries stretching from the Arabian Peninsula to Central Asia; the majority of CENTCOM 
forces, however, are concentrated in the Gulf (specifically the six GCC states and Iraq). In 
implementing this security regime, the US signed bilateral defense and access agreements with 
each of the GCC states between the years 1990 and 1994 - based in part on the analysis of 
CENTCOM that the GCC states could not be counted on to provide for the security of the region 
and that, therefore, the US must become “the Gulf’s policeman.”119 
The attacks of September 11th, 2001 would lead to the further entrenchment of the US 
presence in the Gulf. In the span of a year and a half - the period of time between 9/11 and the 
invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003 - the US set about building new military facilities in 
Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain (initially in support of its operations in Afghanistan).120 The years 
2003 through 2011 would mark the peak of US military engagement in the region - with the 
occupation of Iraq, the escalation of the drone war against non-state militants, and the ongoing 
war in Afghanistan nearby. There has since been much speculation about the possibilities of a 
long term decline in the US presence in the Gulf going forward in response to a number of 
factors: the political and strategic setbacks resulting from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; a 
greater focus on relations in East and Southeast Asia (the so-called ‘pivot to Asia’); and the US’s 
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diminishing dependence on foreign oil.121 Indeed, while we may be past the point of peak US 
engagement in the Gulf, the US is still far more embedded in the region than it was in 1990 or 
even in early-2001. As then-US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said in a speech in 2013: 
“Even as we put our presence on a more sustainable long-term footing, our capabilities in the 
[Middle East] region will far exceed those that were in place September 11, 2001.”122 The US, at 
present, still has military personnel stationed in each of the GCC countries in addition to “more 
than 5,000…military advisers, trainers and attack helicopter crews in Iraq.”123 Furthermore, the 
Trump administration is considering “sending several thousands of additional troops to 
Kuwait…as a “reserve” force for the anti-ISIS fight.”124 
 Given the magnitude of the US military presence in the Gulf, the US essentially serves as 
protector of the GCC states from the potential threats posed by Iran and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. 
While the US may be genuinely interested in the stability of the region, however, its protection 
of the GCC states is contingent on an alignment of interests vis-à-vis the power politics of the 
region rather than any deep affection for the ruling families of the GCC monarchies. For this 
reason, GCC leaders are unable to rely on their respective alliances with the US as long-term 
strategies for ensuring their external security. Additionally, these regimes’ close ties to the US 
may only be exacerbating their domestic political insecurities by provoking anti-Western 
criticisms. The fact remains, however, that in the short-to-medium term, the US presence in the 
Gulf is a feature of the regional inter-state system - acting as a preemptive deterrent against 
breaches of the GCC states’ sovereignty of the sort exhibited by Iraq in 1990. 
 
 
Iran: A Disruptive Power 
 
 While Iran’s role as a regional power in the Gulf had been cemented for some time prior 
to the Gulf wars of 1990-91 and 2003 (as indicated by its centrality in the minds of Western 
policymakers), the effects of these events vis-à-vis Iran are notable here due to the impacts they 
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had on Iran’s relative power standing in regard to Iraq. First, Iran’s position was strengthened as 
result of Iraq’s decline as a security threat in the aftermath of 1991.125 Second (although 
indignant toward the expansion of US military presence in the region that the 2003 Gulf War 
required), Iran has increasingly taken advantage of the opportunities which a weakened, post-
Ba‘thist Iraq has offered - seeking close ties with the vulnerable, and newly Shi‘a-majority, 
government in Baghdad. As the US occupation of Iraq began to wind down in 2010-11, Iran saw 
its influence in Iraq become more pronounced while the rise of IS in 2014 gave it the opportunity 
to install a significant military presence in Iraq.126 
 Tehran’s heightened influence in Baghdad has played into GCC fears of Iran’s 
aspirations in the region and contributed to the rise in GCC-Iranian tensions in recent years. 
These tensions culminated, in January of 2016, in Saudi Arabia cutting diplomatic ties with 
Tehran in response to protests in Iran over the execution of a Shi‘a cleric in Saudi Arabia.127 
Bahrain quickly followed suit while the UAE downgraded relations and recalled their 
ambassador from Tehran. 
While Kuwait has recently (in July of 2017) fallen out with Iran over alleged links 
between Tehran and terrorist networks in Kuwait, it has generally had amicable relations with 
Iran in recent years and has, at times (along with Oman and Qatar), acted as a mediator between 
Iran and its various rivals.128 In 2014, Kuwait became the first US-allied Arab Gulf state to send 
a head of state to Iran since the 1979 revolution (when Emir Sheikh Sabah visited Tehran in June 
of that year).129 Additionally, prior to its current dispute with Iran, Kuwait had been mediating 
on behalf of the rest of the GCC states with Iran in an effort to de-escalate regional tensions. In 
January of 2017, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Khaled al-Sabah visited Tehran, 
delivering a letter from the Kuwaiti Emir calling for greater dialogue between the GCC states 
and Iran.130 This visit was reciprocated in February, when Iranian president Hassan Rouhani 
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travelled to both Kuwait and Oman in order to further discussions on problematic issue areas 
such as the conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Iraq.131 The volatile nature of the Iranian-GCC 
relationship, while rarely rising to the level of an actual security threat to Kuwait, certainly 
contributes to the complexity of Kuwait’s relations in the region and with Iraq specifically (given 
its close ties with Iran) - adding a level of uncertainty which must be accounted for in its 
medium- and long-term policymaking. 
 
 
Social Structure in the Gulf: Sovereignty & Arab Nationalism 
 
Given Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990-91, the question of Kuwait’s sovereignty has 
been central to the relationship between Kuwait and Iraq in recent decades. This fact has been 
reflected in their rhetoric concerning their relations with one another - with Kuwaiti officials 
regularly invoking their sovereignty and the Iraqi government repeatedly stating its respect for 
Kuwait’s sovereignty.132 On this question of Iraq’s regard for Kuwait’s sovereignty, however, it 
is important to note that Kuwait and Iraq are inhabiting a regional social structure that has 
undergone significant change since Iraq’s invasion in 1990 - one in which the norm of 
sovereignty has become more deeply internalized (or, as Wendt would describe it, one in which 
the culture has become more Lockean).133 
Entwined with this process of internalization has been the concurrent decline of the 
ideology of Arab nationalism. The dominant political ideology throughout the Arab world for 
much of the mid-to-late twentieth century, Arab nationalism gives precedence to the broader 
Arab population as a political entity over the individual Arab states. Debates (somewhat 
naturally) arose within the Arab world over what the interests of the Arab nation were, who 
should represent it, and how much deference Arab states and leaders should give to this broader 
Arab constituency. The last of these debates touched upon the very sovereignty of Arab states, 
with the more extreme variations of Arab nationalism dismissing these states as imperialist 
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fabrications and promoting the political unification of the Arab world. This posed a serious 
problem for the leaders of Arab states: while these leaders often had to make appeals to Arab 
nationalism in order to maintain their legitimacy, the fact remained that it was the states 
themselves that were the sources of their positions of power and where their primary 
constituencies were located. 
Arab nationalism, furthermore, often placed considerable constraints on the behavior of 
Arab states in the form of “normative expectations” (e.g. defining which states were acceptable 
allies, defining how Arab states were supposed to behave toward one another…).134 
Nevertheless, Arab nationalism was at times an effective tool for those states or individuals who 
were able to position themselves as leaders of the Arab world. By manipulating the narratives 
through which events, ideas and policies were interpreted, these leaders were often able to 
influence both public opinion and policymakers throughout the Arab world. Framing their 
behavior within the context of Arab nationalism was, therefore, both a requirement of Arab states 
as well as a potential method of projecting power. 
 In the case of Iraq, the rhetoric of Arab nationalism was key to Saddam’s efforts to 
legitimize his foreign policy behavior. This was most effective during the Iran-Iraq War, with 
Saddam claiming to be defending the entire Arab nation from the threat of revolutionary Iran. As 
Iraq began preparing to invade Kuwait in the summer of 1990, Saddam again employed the 
rhetoric of Arab nationalism - this time in an attempt to posture Iraq as protector of the Arab 
world from Western imperialism.135 In a July national broadcast, Saddam declared (in reference 
to the ruling families of Kuwait and the UAE): “The policies of some Arab rulers…are inspired 
by America to undermine Arab interests and security.”136 
Despite Saddam’s attempts to frame the event, the response of the Arab world to Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait was deeply divided. Ultimately, a narrow majority of Arab League member-
states would condemn the action in a resolution at an emergency summit convened in Cairo.137 
The fact that the vote on the resolution was the most divisive in the history of the Arab League, 
however - with only 12 of the then-21 member-states voting in favor of it - was an indication of 
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how deeply the Arab nationalist project was in trouble.138 Furthermore, with the Arab world 
divided - and their military capabilities questionable - there appeared to be no ‘Arab’ solution to 
the problem of restoring Kuwait’s sovereignty. That Western intervention was required to 
remedy the situation meant that many Arab states found themselves in the position of acting as 
minor partners in a US-led coalition to solve an inter-Arab problem. The crisis was, therefore, 
problematic for Arab nationalism beyond the fact that it involved one Arab state invading 
another: it also laid bare the inability of the Arab nation to resolve inter-Arab issues in an 
effective manner, leading the way to a significant expansion of Western involvement in the 
region. 
With the restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty, Arab nationalism (already weakened by its 
internal debates and the concessions made to the US and Israel by Egypt and Saudi Arabia) 
became the primary victim of the Gulf War.139 As Arab nationalism lost its place at the center of 
the regional social structure, however, the norm of state sovereignty became more deeply 
internalized by Arab states - ultimately becoming explicitly coupled with their conceptions of 
their own security. As Michael Barnett put it, “[t]he retreat to the state” within the Arab world at 
the time “was unmistakable.”140 As a result of this shift in social structure, the challenging of one 
Arab state’s sovereignty by another under the banner of Arab nationalism - as foolish as it may 
have been in 1990 - would be practically unthinkable today. 
 On a final note regarding sovereignty in the Gulf, the 2003 US-led invasion deserves 
mention. Regardless of how wide the support for Saddam’s removal was - both within as well as 
outside of Iraq - the invasion was problematic for the norm of sovereignty in the region. Here 
was the former defender of Kuwait’s sovereignty, the US, seemingly demonstrating that 
individual state interests superseded the collective interest of upholding the norms of the 
international system. The fact that the invasion had such destabilizing effects on the region, 
however, may have actually reinforced the notion of sovereignty as being central to security in 
the eyes of the Gulf states. Further, the feeling amongst many Iraqis (even those who opposed 
Saddam) that the US had unrightfully imposed itself upon Iraq may have additionally contributed 
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to a greater recognition of the importance state sovereignty.141 Similarly, challenges to the Iraqi 
state by non-state actors such as IS may be doing the very same today. As such, the Iraqi state - 
formerly the primary threat to the norm of sovereignty in the region - has become a staunch 
defender of this norm now that its own sovereignty has come under threat (both by more 
powerful states as well as by non-state actors). 
 
 
Regional Effects 
 
The changes within the regional structures of the Gulf and the broader Middle East in 
recent decades, as demonstrated throughout this chapter, have been both dramatic and various. 
The effects of these structural changes on intra-structural bilateral relationships have therefore 
been multifaceted - at times acting in contradiction to one another, while at others working in 
conjunction to produce certain outcomes. As such, it is often difficult to isolate causal factors or 
identify simple cause-and-effect relationships. That said, what follows are relatively generalized 
observations regarding the effects of the regional developments discussed in this chapter on 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations.  
In terms of material structure, the decline of Iraq’s position has been pivotal, particularly 
in light of the increased capabilities of Saudi Arabia and the increased involvement of the US. 
This has not only constrained the possibilities of what is achievable with Iraq’s own capabilities, 
but has also provided Kuwait with explicit security assurances. In addition to these security 
assurances, however, Kuwait has been bolstered in its dealings with Iraq by a regional structure 
which has offered it numerous alternatives in its foreign relations (i.e. Saudi Arabia, the US, and 
even Iran). As Robert Jervis has observed: “Structure strongly influences the state’s needs and 
alternatives, which in turn establish its bargaining power.”142 Conversely, Iraq - sorely in need of 
foreign investment and regional allies - has seen its bargaining leverage in its relations with 
Kuwait decline drastically - far beyond its decline in relative power. 
                                               
141 “National Survey of Iraq: February 2004,” Oxford Research Group, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_03_04_iraqsurvey.pdf. 
142 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 209. 
 
 
Jackson 39 
 
In regard to the social structure of the Gulf, the norm of sovereignty has become more 
internalized within the culture of the region as the ideology of Arab nationalism has receded. 
Further, the state which formerly posed the greatest threat to sovereignty in the Gulf, Iraq, has 
been reconstituted as an actor whose legitimacy, interests and identity rely on the norm of 
sovereignty - particularly as its own sovereignty has become threatened by transnational non-
state actors. This analysis of social structure perhaps explains, in part, why Kuwait is offering the 
assistance that it is to Iraq: in doing so, Kuwait is essentially initiating a joint effort of further 
strengthening and asserting the norm of sovereignty as the foundation of inter-state relations in 
the Gulf. More fundamentally, however, the Kuwaiti government’s assistance to Iraq 
demonstrates its perception that Iraq will continue to abide by this norm - allowing for “absolute 
gains [to] override relative losses” in the minds of Kuwaiti policymakers.143 Indeed, as Wendt 
writes, “[i]f states think that others recognize their sovereignty…then survival is not at stake if 
their relative power falls.”144 
Finally, despite Kuwait’s security assurances (or Iraq’s respect for its sovereignty), there 
are indeed still a number of potential threats that it faces. The most pressing of these include: 
violence on the part of non-state extremist organizations (which Kuwait experienced first-hand in 
2015 when IS bombed a Shi‘a mosque, killing 27);145 Iranian revisionism; Saudi political 
subjugation; and internal political insecurities. Kuwait’s efforts to mend ties with Iraq, therefore, 
make sense on a number of strategic levels beyond the mere courting of closer relations with a 
larger neighbor who could potentially pose a threat in the future: First of all, Kuwait is willing, 
for the moment, to empower Iraq (through aid, economic investment and international 
legitimation) in exchange for reducing the threat of political violence from non-state actors. 
Additionally, deepening ties with Iraq could serve to counter the influence of Iran in Baghdad146 
- a strategy which the US has actively encouraged.147 Finally, by seeking close relations with 
Iraq, Kuwait is forming ties with a potential regional power other than Saudi Arabia - while also 
showing its willingness to work closely with a large state in the region which is far closer to 
Tehran than it is to Riyadh. 
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Chapter 4 
Kuwait’s Hedging Strategy: 
Small States & Structural Power 
 
 
 Building on the research presented in the two previous chapters, this thesis will now 
apply Kuik’s analytical framework of hedging to an analysis of Kuwait’s behavior toward Iraq 
(and, to a lesser degree, toward the other regional powers). Subsequently, theories of 
international relations regarding structural power and small states will be evoked in order to 
provide a broader conceptual understanding of Kuwait’s hedging behavior and the effects of 
regional structures on Kuwait’s policy toward Iraq. 
 
 
Kuwait’s Strategy of Hedging toward Iraq 
 
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, strategic hedging has emerged as an analytical 
concept for understanding the behavior of small states which do not conform to the traditional, 
realist model - which assumes that small states are bound to either bandwagon with or balance 
against larger powers. Hedging has therefore proved useful within the context of describing the 
behavior of small states responding to rising powers within regional structures undergoing 
change. As defensive realism emphasizes, however, (most notably in Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of 
threats’ theory)148 it is often more useful to think of international relations in terms of the 
potential threats which states pose, rather than the power that they hold. Accordingly, hedging 
should be viewed, first and foremost, as a foreign policy strategy for engaging with states which 
pose a potential threat. In this way, while it may be difficult to think of Iraq as a regional power 
(either presently or in the near future), the potential threat it poses to a small, geopolitically 
vulnerable country such as Kuwait cannot be discounted. Furthermore, in the medium-to-long 
term, Iraq could indeed re-emerge as a consequential military and economic power in the Gulf. 
                                               
148 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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Kuwait’s response to these circumstances has been, for the time being, to attempt to benefit from 
both the risk-contingency options as well as the return-maximizing options of hedging in its 
dealings with Iraq. 
Regarding the first risk-contingency option, indirect-balancing, Kuwait is still largely 
aligned on security matters with the same countries which came to Kuwait’s rescue in the wake 
of the 1990 Iraqi invasion (namely the US and Saudi Arabia). These security alliances were, 
initially, designed to directly balance against the Iraqi threat (as well as Iran). The question now, 
however, is whether Kuwait is still balancing directly against Iraq, or whether these alliances 
have been adapted to Kuwait’s evolving security needs while remaining an assurance (albeit 
indirectly) against any threat which Iraq might pose. The distinction between direct and indirect 
balancing may not always be clear in a given situation, but refers to whether security efforts are 
aimed at a specific threat or diffuse, non-specific threats. While Iraq may still pose a potential 
threat to Kuwait, the fact that the US and (to a lesser degree) Kuwait itself are actively 
cooperating with Iraq on security matters indicates that Kuwait’s balancing is now aimed only 
indirectly at Iraq. 
According to Kuik, there are two means by which states can engage in dominance-denial 
(the second risk-contingency option of hedging): “by: (a) involving other powers in regional 
affairs; and (b) developing their own resilience and strengthening their collective diplomatic 
clout.”149 As such, Kuwait is engaging in dominance-denial on both grounds: First and foremost, 
they played a central role in the expansion of the US presence in the Gulf from the early 1990s 
through the Iraq War and are still hosting significant numbers of US troops today. Second, 
Kuwait has consistently aimed to bolster their own standing and influence on matters of regional 
diplomacy through mediation, humanitarian aid programs and emphasizing cooperation within 
intergovernmental organizations such as the GCC or the UN - which are often useful in 
amplifying the voices of coalitions of small states. The relevance of dominance-denial to 
Kuwait’s relationship with Iraq, however, may be questionable in the current context given that 
there is no prospect of Iraq establishing regional dominance anytime soon. This said, it is 
important to note, first, that Kuwait is clearly practicing the behavior which constitutes 
dominance-denial and, second, that this behavior would indeed work to counter Iraqi attempts at 
dominance should it re-emerge as a regional power. 
                                               
149 Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging,” 169-70. 
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 As far as the return-maximizing options of hedging strategies - economic-pragmatism, 
binding-engagement and limited-bandwagoning - it appears that Kuwait is engaging in both the 
first and the second of these. Kuwait’s economic-pragmatism has been evident in its investments 
in Iraq (most prominently in energy and telecommunications) as well as the steps that it has 
taken to begin importing Iraqi natural gas - which could work to dramatically increase the two 
countries’ bilateral interdependencies on one another. Binding-engagement (that is, “regularized 
diplomatic” activity) between Kuwait and Iraq was, given their contentious history and lingering 
issues, a practical necessity in order for the reopening of bilateral relations to take place.150 The 
two have shown increasing willingness, however, to go above and beyond the minimum 
demands which the maintaining of relations would require - most recently leading to the 
humanitarian aid package which Kuwait pledged to the Iraqi government in April of 2017. 
The final return-maximizing option of hedging, limited-bandwagoning, is not currently a 
component of Kuwait’s policy toward Iraq (although it may be an adequate description of 
Kuwait’s respective relations with Saudi Arabia or the US - a full analysis of these relations, 
however, is beyond the scope of this research). Kuik describes limited-bandwagoning as 
requiring both: “(a) policy coordination on selective issues; and (b) voluntary deference giving to 
the larger partner.”151 (Kuik also differentiates limited-bandwagoning from pure-bandwagoning 
in that the latter comprises both “political and military alignment” with a larger power, while the 
former refers only to political alignment.152) While Kuwait is indeed coordinating with Iraq on a 
number of issues (e.g. terrorism, trade, humanitarian aid…), there is no voluntary deference to 
Baghdad to speak of at this time. 
 Kuwait, therefore, is engaging in four out of the five constituent components of a hedging 
strategy in its relations with Iraq: indirect-balancing, dominance-denial, economic-pragmatism, 
and binding-engagement (as indicated in Kuik’s own research, it may be rare that a state employs 
all five of these options within a given bilateral relationship). As for limited-bandwagoning, 
although it is not a component of Kuwait’s relationship with Iraq, it may indeed play a role in its 
broader regional policy (in as far as it may be useful to Kuwait in maintaining autonomy from 
Saudi Arabia and the US). 
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Strategic Hedging, Structural Power & Small States 
 
The case of Kuwait’s relations with Iraq is an example of how, through strategic hedging, 
small states may be able to capitalize on the structural power afforded to them by the 
configurations of regional and international structures. As such, hedging has enabled Kuwait to 
prepare for multiple potential security threats while maximizing short-term economic and 
political benefits. Additionally, by cultivating relations with multiple larger states, Kuwait may 
be putting itself in a position to maximize its bargaining leverage in its dealings with these 
various partners in that it is creating diplomatic, economic and security alternatives for itself in 
the future. 
 In its analysis of Kuwait’s hedging strategy, this thesis has found Barnett and Duvall’s 
conceptualization of structural power to be particularly useful in that - inasmuch as Kuwait’s 
policy toward Iraq is an active choice on the part of Kuwait’s domestic leadership - it is 
ultimately enabled by (and dependent on) regional structural configurations. Accordingly, this 
thesis has identified a number of structural changes in recent decades which have ultimately 
served to empower Kuwait in its relations with Iraq: Firstly, the region’s material structure was 
utterly transformed by the confluence of Iraq’s decline as a regional power, the rise of Saudi 
Arabia, and the increased regional engagement on the part of the US. This structural 
configuration grants Kuwait greater alternatives, and therefore leverage, in its relations with Iraq. 
Secondly, the further internalization of the norm of state sovereignty in the Gulf (and the Arab 
world) - in conjunction with the decline of Arab nationalism - has resulted in a social structure in 
which Kuwait can rest relatively well-assured that Iraq has no ideological legitimation for 
infringing upon its sovereignty. 
It is, therefore, due to the alternatives and security assurances that Kuwait has been 
afforded by regional structures which have enabled it to indirectly balance against Iraq while still 
actively taking part in bilateral binding-engagement. This is not to neglect the reality that Kuwait 
does indeed still face potential threats to its security. Rather, while Kuwait is enabled to pursue 
its policy of hedging by the configuration of regional structures - the ultimate adoption of this 
policy has been incentivized by the pressure on Kuwait to plan contingencies for multiple 
 
 
Jackson 44 
 
potential threats. It is the fact that none of these threats is imminent, however, that allows Kuwait 
maneuverability, for the time being, in its regional relations. 
In its application of the analytical frameworks of strategic hedging and structural power, 
this thesis has demonstrated the usefulness of these concepts in the analysis of small state 
behavior in international relations: By adopting policies of hedging, states may be able to 
capitalize on their structural power without having to exert power directly over other states;153 
small states - by definition limited in their ability to project power through traditional, hard 
power means - may therefore be more likely to resort to hedging strategies and structural power 
in their foreign policies. 
 
____________________ 
 
Of course, we must be careful not to extrapolate too much based on a single case study - 
especially given the particularities of the history between Kuwait and Iraq and the region which 
they inhabit. The conceptual frameworks outlined in this thesis must be tested further in various 
other analyses in order for theorists to gain a fuller understanding of their applicabilities to 
comparable cases. In regard to Kuwait and its relations with Iraq, however, we can conclude that 
the dual concepts of hedging and structural power are indeed informative and hold significant 
explanatory power in that they: first, provide an adequate description of Kuwait’s behavior 
(hedging); and second, account for the effects of regional structures (which, although 
multifaceted, have ultimately served to empower Kuwait in its interactions with Iraq). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
153 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 53; Kamrava, Qatar, 49. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 The primary aim of this thesis has been to shed light on Kuwait’s evolving relationship 
with Iraq in the post-Saddam era. As such, chapter one provided an overview of the theoretical 
concepts referred to throughout this work. Chapter two laid out Kuwait and Iraq’s historical 
relations with one another and detailed the trajectory of their relationship since 2003. Chapter 
three contextualized this bilateral relationship through a discussion of the material and social 
structures in the Gulf region. Finally, chapter four made the argument that Kuwait is currently 
engaging in a policy of strategic hedging toward Iraq - enabled by the structural power it 
currently holds and incentivized by the number of threats present in the region. 
 
____________________ 
 
In light of the research presented throughout these chapters, this thesis has been able to 
come to two conclusions: First, that Kuwait is indeed hedging toward Iraq in that it has 
significantly expanded its diplomatic and economic engagement with Baghdad while still relying 
on its relationships with the US and Saudi Arabia for its security. Second, regional structures 
(both material and social) have had substantial influence on the adoption of this policy in that 
Kuwait has been enabled to pursue a hedging strategy by the structural power which the 
configuration of regional structures have afforded it. In regard to material structure, Kuwait has 
been empowered by the expansion of its security alternatives (and bargaining leverage) in the 
region since the 1990-91 war - primarily as a result of the increased regional engagement of the 
US and Saudi Arabia’s rise as a regional military power. As far as social structure, Kuwait has 
gained additional security assurances as the norm of state sovereignty has become more deeply 
internalized (albeit not fully) as a cultural norm in the region - and as Iraq has been reconstituted 
as an actor abiding by and accepting of this norm. Additionally, Kuwait’s hedging strategy has 
been incentivized by the number of potential threats present in the region (i.e. Iraqi aggression, 
Iranian revisionism, Saudi dominance, and violence on the part of non-state actors) as well as the 
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likelihood of continuing material structural change in the form of further shifts in the power 
politics in the region. Kuwait is therefore required to plan contingencies for multiple potential 
threats; the fact that none of these threats is imminent, however, grants Kuwait maneuverability 
in its regional relations - allowing it to engage in a multi-pronged hedging strategy. 
All of this is not to say that Kuwait’s hedging strategy is not also influenced, in part, by 
domestic politics. Indeed, this may well be the case (one of the limitations of this research has 
been that domestic determinants were not able to be explored further) - but it is ultimately 
regional and international structures which determine states’ possibilities for action on the 
international stage and define the external threats which they may face. Thus, while Kuwait may 
desire better relations with Baghdad in order to avoid a repeat of the 1990 invasion, this is not an 
imminent concern. More immediately, a better relationship with Iraq may grant more bargaining 
leverage to Kuwait in its relations with (and eventually reduce its dependence on) its other larger 
partners - Saudi Arabia and the US. 
In its analysis of how regional structures have affected the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship, this 
thesis has also sought to refine the conceptual frameworks available for the analysis of small 
states and hedging behavior. As such, this research has found Barnett and Duvall’s 
conceptualization of structural power to be useful in that it refers to the power afforded to states 
by structural configurations, rather than the power they hold due to their own capabilities and are 
able to wield directly over other states. Accordingly, small states are less likely to be able to rely 
on their own capabilities when dealing with larger states - and therefore more likely to resort to 
alternative, indirect means of projecting power on the international stage. Additionally, small 
state hedging strategies are dependent on particular structural configurations - ones in which 
there are multiple larger potential partners, on the one hand, and no significant imminent threats, 
on the other. It is hoped that the theoretical connections laid out in this thesis will be investigated 
further in other various case studies. 
It would appear that Kuwait has so far been relatively successful in harnessing its 
structural power - stepping up its regional engagement while maintaining its security alliances. 
This strategy holds the potential to greatly benefit Kuwait in the near future - further increasing 
its structural power as it develops relations with multiple larger partners and, therefore, 
increasing its alternatives and bargaining leverage in its relations with those partners. On the 
other hand, however, it may also prove to add to Kuwait’s insecurities - weakening its existing 
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alliances, opening it up to criticism from within its own population, or leading to significant 
economic losses from its investments in a still unstable Iraqi economy. Furthermore, as this 
hedging strategy is only possible in an environment where there is a lack of imminent threats, the 
future of this strategy is, in many ways, dependent on factors outside of the control of Kuwaiti 
policymakers. 
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